管理层权力对过度投资影响的实证研究
谭庆美;李敏
【期刊名称】《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》 【年(卷),期】2014(000)004
【摘要】Based on the data of Chinese listed firms on main board during year 2007-2011, the impact of managerial power on overinvestment was investigated using multiple regression method .The results show that there is significantly positive relation-ship between overinvestment and managerial power .The manager who is an internal director and the manager in other firm will own greater structure power and prestige power , and will be more likely to power -rent through overinvestment .The results also show that the higher the manager's professional title which can bring greater expert power , the more likely the managers extract rents in the way of overinvestment in listed firms in China .%以2007-2011年我国主板上市企业为样本，采用多元回归方法实证分析了管理层权力对企业过度投资的影响。研究结果表明，我国上市企业管理层的综合权力越大，企业过度投资现象越严重。管理层如果担任内部董事或同时在其他单位任职，管理层的组织权力和声望权力更大，越有可能通过过度投资寻租。管理层职称越高，管理层的专家权力越大，越有可能实施过度投资。 【总页数】6页(571-575,580) 【关键词】管理层权力;过度投资;寻租 【作者】谭庆美;李敏
管理层权力对过度投资影响的实证研究
