附 录1：英文原文
The Renminbi’s Dollar Peg at The Crossroads
In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency-basket peg. Over the longer term, China’s large, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and, eventually, convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be a two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them. First, establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar, manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Second, put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis.
From 1997 until July 21, 2005, the Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi(RMB) price of the United States dollar within a narrow range. On July 21, 2005, China’s authorities moved to an adjustable basket peg against the dollar, with a revaluation of the central RMB/$ rate of 2.1 percent relative to the prior central rate of RMB 8.28 per dollar.
Very notably in view of the claims that China’s exchange rate policy is dictated by the imperative of maintaining an undervalued currency, the authorities resisted substantial devaluation pressures, at the cost of some deflation, during the Asian crisis period starting in 1997. For some time now the situation has been reversed, with strong revaluation pressures, speculative capital inflows, and gathering inflationary
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momentum in the economy. The ability to resist speculative pressures comes from the maintenance of restrictions on private capital flows, especially inflows, as well as from administrative controls useful in restraining inflation.
Nonetheless, “hot money” inflows have helped swell China’s foreign reserves immensely in recent years. Prior to July 21, 2005, most observers, and indeed the Chinese government itself, acknowledged that China’s exchange-rate arrangements were unsustainable and undesirable as a long-term foundation for responding, without disruptive episodes of inflation or deflation, to inevitable real-side shocks, as well as to secular changes in the economy such as real appreciation due to Balassa-Samuelson effects. At the time of unification, the parallel rate already stood at a depreciated level relative to the official rate. Revaluation-cum-“flexation” is a response to the situation, including the external trade pressures it had generated, but leaves questions about how flexibility will be exploited in the future.
So far, even the ±0.3 percent margins of RMB/$ flexibility that exist have not been utilized fully. Furthermore, capital markets that are open to the world seem a prerequisite for a modern high-income economy such as China seeks eventually to become. The issues concern the transition. how might China best move toward a genuinely more flexible exchange-rate regime. And how might it best dismantle capital controls. And how might it optimally sequence these two conceptually distinct liberalization initiatives.
In the following pages I have four goals. First, to provide a brief overview of developments in China’s real exchange rate, external accounts, and inflation, thereby filling in some concomitants of the nominal exchange rate trajectory in Figure. Second, to draw parallels with the experience of Germany (still the world’s premier exporter)during the Bretton Woods era. Third, to discuss the rather successful experiences of Chile and Israel in transiting from pegged exchange rates with capital controls to floating rates with financial opening. Fourth and finally, to sketch a blueprint for gradually flexing the RMB’s exchange rate in advance of capital-account liberalization. A feature of the basket system is that intervention in support of the basket rate could still be carried out entirely in the RMB/$ market. The reason is that
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the basket can be implemented entirely through a variable RMB/$ exchange rate target. As a technical matter, the band could be redefined each morning using the exchange dollar rates prevailing earlier that day in the Tokyo markets. Or it could be updated more frequently. The decision to peg to a basket is also separable in principle from the decision on the denomination of foreign-currency reserves. Diversification of official reserves in line with the basket weights would serve to stabilize the value of reserves in terms of RMB, but is not otherwise a necessary adjunct of a basket peg system.
Once market forces are given greater play in determining the day-to-day value of the RMB/$ rate, the RMB might well move initially to the strong edge of any band that was established. For that reason, it is important that the existing capital flow controls not be dismantled until the exchange rate bands have been widened to the point where a managed float has been achieved. The move to a currency band, a band that could be widened over time, would render superfluous some of the ad hoc liberalization measures that have been deployed to ease exchange-rate pressures. Many discussions make insufficient distinction between enhanced exchange flexibility, which can be achieved (with less currency volatility) under restricted international financial flows, and openness of the financial account. The two are completely different, and a less risky sequencing would tackle the full gradual relaxation of financial-account controls only after the achievement of a good degree of exchange-rate flexibility. Eichengreen (2005) and Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang (2005) lay out the case for this sequencing in greater detail. The manifest hazards of opening to inflows in the current setting of domestic banking-system weakness furnishes one of the most compelling arguments for placing further decontrol of the financial account on the back burner. In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency peg.
Over the longer term, China’s large, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility, and eventually, currency convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB
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exchange rate would be the following two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them:
Establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar. Manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Possibly allow a trend crawl in the band to accommodate long-run real exchange rate changes due to structural changes along Balassa-Samuelson lines.
Put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB/basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis. Only a resilient financial sector will be able to withstand the occasional sharp interest-rate changes that the monetary authorities may find necessary – whether they are responding to incipient unwanted exchange-rate movements or to domestic inflationary pressures.
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附 录2：中文译文
人民币汇率在十字路口
面对巨大的收支盈余和内部通货膨胀的压力，中国一直处在一个经典的其货币盯住一篮子货币的汇率机制下的内部和外部平衡之间的冲突。长远看来，中国的大型现代化和多元化的经济将需要汇率灵活性，并最终开放资本市场的可兑换。一个可行的和有吸引力的出口战略，从本质上固定人民币汇率将会是一个两阶段的方法，一致与2005年7月以来已经采取步骤，但超越他们。首先,为与人民币有关的一篮子主要贸易伙伴的货币建立一个有限的交易带。建立传送带，以便允许一些人民币对美元原始的估价，如果有必要，可以再这个地带管理一篮子货币汇率，随着国内外汇市场的发展，还可以拓宽这个地带。第二,暂缓特设金融市场自由化措施。他们将很难帮助缓解人民币汇率升值压力，一旦人民币汇对一篮子汇率可以允许在一个地带灵活移动，最好推迟直到国内外汇市场进一步发展，汇率完全灵活，国内的金融体制加强,并放在一个以市场为导向的基础之上。
从1997年到2005年7月21日，中国当局把用美元表示的人民币的价值限制在一个较窄的范围内。2005年7月21日，中国当局开始实行兑美元的可调节的一篮子货币的汇率, 相对于之前的中间价8.28元/美元，人民币对美元汇率升值2.1%。
在从1997年开始的亚洲金融危机期间，他们很明显针对宣称中国汇率政策被称作是维持一个被低估的货币,当局抵抗实质性的贬值压力, 以通货紧缩为代价。一段时间以来，形势已经逆转, 人民币具有较强的升值压力, 投机资本流入, 并在经济中聚集了通货膨胀的势头。能够抵御来自维护限制私人资本流动的投机压力, 以及从行政管制有效地抑制通货膨胀，尤其是资本的流入。
尽管如此, 在最近的几年里，“热钱”的流入加剧了中国外汇储备的极大的膨胀。在2005年7月21日之前, 大多数观察家，事实上，中国政府本身，承认中国的汇率安排作为长期的基础是不能成立的，不和需要的，没有破坏性的发作的通货膨胀或通货紧缩, 必然是真正几个方面的冲击，以及对经济的长期变化，比如说由于巴拉萨萨缪尔森效应引起的长期的增值。在联合的时候, 平行汇率已达到一个相对于贬值官方利率水平。附带增长的货币增长是一种情境化的反应，包括对外贸易已经产生的压力，但是遗留下来关于如何开发未来的灵活性的问
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专业外文文献翻译
