C EO 权力对盈余管理影响的实证研究
张鹏;谭庆美;李胜楠;董小芳
【期刊名称】《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》 【年(卷),期】2015(000)005
【摘要】以操纵性应计利润衡量盈余管理程度，以我国上市企业2007—2013年数据为样本，实证分析了CEO综合权力及不同权力维度变量对盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明，我国上市企业的CEO综合权力越大，企业盈余管理程度越高，权力大的CEO越可能实施正向盈余管理。较高的股权集中度和董事会独立性能够减少CEO利用权力实施盈余管理的行为，持有股份越多的CEO越不可能实施盈余管理。osed on the sample of listed firms in China during the period 2007-2013, the impact of CEO power on earning management was investigated while discretionary accruals were employed as measurement of earning management.The results show that the CEO power has significantly positive impact on earning management;the CEOs with strong powers are more likely to implement positive earning management.The higher ownership concentration and board independence can decrease earning man-agement of CEOs.The CEOs who own stake are less likely to implement earning management. 【总页数】5页(640-644)
【关键词】CEO权力;盈余管理;操纵性应计利润 【作者】张鹏;谭庆美;李胜楠;董小芳
【作者单位】天津大学 财务处，天津 300072;天津大学 管理与经济学部，天
C EO 权力对盈余管理影响的实证研究
