TPL & VMI 在供应链决策中之博弈分析与优化
陈静;丁涛;何远远
【期刊名称】《武汉理工大学学报（交通科学与工程版）》 【年(卷),期】2015(000)002
【摘要】Based on the complete and perfect information of dynamic game methods ,TPL & VMI Dy‐namic Game Model of Supply Chain Cooperation Mechanism is established .After the introduction of TPL (TPL) for a single manufacturer‐one supplier of VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) supply chain decision analysis model was constructed and solved .TPL were not involved in the analysis of the sup‐ply chain inventory decision and participate in the profits of the supply chain inventory decision after parties in the supply chain ,decentralized decision and centralized control of profit under the parties . The use of centralized control of finishing profit TPL & VMI supply chain optimization analysis ,opti‐mization results show that centralized control of the supply chain could achieve optimal profits .%基于完全且完美信息动态博弈方法，建立了 TPL&VMI（引入第三方物流的供应商管理库存）供应链合作机制的非零和动态博弈模型。引入 T PL （第三方物流企业）后对单制造商—单供应商的VMI（供应商管理库存）供应链决策模型进行分析、构建与求解。分别分析了 TPL不参与供应链库存决策和参与供应链库存决策后供应链中各方的利润情况，即分散决策和集中控制下各方的利润。利用集中控制对TPL&VMI供应链的整理利润进行优化分析，优化结果表明集中控制能使供应
TPL & VMI 在供应链决策中之博弈分析与优化
