Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task
Assignment
Yonglong Zhang;Haiyan Qin;Bin Li;Jin Wang;Sungyoung Lee;Zhiqiu Huang
【期刊名称】《清华大学学报（英文版）》 【年(卷),期】2024(023)006 【
摘
要
】
As
an
emerging
\
problem
solving
strategy\want to employ reliable workers to complete specific tasks.Task assignment is an important branch of crowdsourcing.Most existing studies in crowdsourcing have not considered self-interested individuals' strategy.To guarantee truthfulness,auction has been regarded as a promising method to charge the requesters for the tasks completed and reward the workers for performing the tasks.In this study,an online task assignment scenario is considered where each worker has a set of experienced skills,whereas a specific task is budget-constrained and requires one or more skills.In this scenario,the crowdsourcing task assignment was modeled as a reverse auction where the requesters are buyers and the workers are sellers.Three incentive mechanisms,namely,Truthful Mechanism for Crawdsourcing-Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (TMC-VCG),TMC-Simple Task (ST) for a simple task case,and TMC-Complex Task (CT) for a complex task case are proposed.Here,a simple task case means that the requester asks for a
Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment
