our interviews with corporate and institutional banking staff. As long as the business unit turned a profit, other shortcomings could be overlooked.”
The phrase “profit is king” denotes a dedication to short-term revenues above longterm considerations and can create a climate where unethical behaviour thrives (Cooke, 1991; Trevino and Nelson, 1995, 1999). It tends to promote an unrealistic belief that everything is about making money and rules of morality may be seen as obstacles or impediments to making money (Wolfe, 1988). Bullen provides the following insight as to how the leaders at the NAB managed the balance between risk and profits： 46When risk starts growing like it was for us, management would normally exercise some control, but it seemed that as long as we were making money, they really didn’t want to upset anyone on the(trading) desk and risk that income stream. So we were pretty much left to our own devices,with minimal interference” (Bullen, 2004, p.24).
In another passage, Bullen states：
In the meantime, limit breaches were being sent to us every day. There seemed to be no problem having them signed off and I didn^ hear that we should have the risk reduced in any way. The desk was up over 16 million in December and Mark suggested to me that they wouldnH do anything, or hassle us in any way, when we were seen to be making good amounts of money...I had no contact with management above me except Mark, or with other areas of the bank, but Mark was keeping me informed on how we were viewed around the group. He suggested that we were seen as the heroes at the moment and that our desk was thought of as a growth area. (Bullen, 2004, p. 103)
Assuming this account to be accurate to at least one of the traders, then the Bank9s leaders appeared fixated with profits and anybody who created profits was unassailable. Even though management did not condone or partake in any of the fraudulent behaviour,they appeared to create an environment for it to flourish. In
sentencing Bullen, Judge Chettle said： 44I accept that your offending occurred in a culture of profit-driven morality”（AAP，2006). Reaction to crisis
The crisis at hand, once discovered by top management, was by all accounts
handled professionally and ethically. The Bank announced the losses immediately and commissioned an external consultant (PwC) to investigate and discover the root of the scandal. The behaviour of the leaders under such difficult circumstances communicated to organisational members a commitment to openness and honesty.However, this was undone in the board’s actions following the release of the investigation reports. The problem initially began with Catherine Walter (ex Chairman of the Audit Committee), who objected to the independence of PwC to investigate the deceit. PwC had been retained by the Bank to be its internal auditor and had reported on risk management matters (APRA, 2004, p. 59), and concluded that the Bank had appropriate internal controls(Turnbull, 2006).APRA noted that 44a review of this report in hindsight may conclude that this work is flawed”（2004, p. 59). Understandably,this caused considerable angst amongst the other directors of the board, as they regarded her claims to be irresponsible and to reflect adversely on the board. Seven of the non-executive directors went as far as proposing an ultimatum, whereby they would all resign unless Walter stood down.Walter claimed that she was made a scapegoat and refused to resign unless the entire board came down with her (Dey, 2004). With the feud threatening to spill over into an extraordinary general meeting (EGM), the boardroom battle attracted unwanted media attention. The EGM,scheduled to exclusively resolve the issue, was eventually cancelled with Walter agreeing to resign on the basis that other directors also resigned at a latter date to renew the board(Tumbull, 2006). The scandal was embarrassing to the Bank and further tarnished its already wounded reputation. Conclusion
This paper has conducted a study of organisational culture that was operative within the NAB (particularly the FX trading room) during a period in which four rogue traders incurred and concealed losses of AUD$360 million. The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent of influence on the traders9 behaviour from the Bank9s culture. According to Schein’s (2004) mechanisms, the Bank’s attention emphasised profit; die Bank’s reaction to the crisis sent confusing signals when the board’s integrity plummeted with infighting over the independence of PwC Report; role modelling by the
Bank9s leaders was dismissive and focused on form over substance; the allocation of rewards to the traders encouraged risk taking beyond prescribed limits; and the Bank appeared to have recruited traders that had a reputation for creating outstanding profits.Consequently, such mechanisms developed a culture that enabled the deception to arise and continue for a substantial period of time.
Leadership themes at the NAB appeared to focus on profit, processes, abrogation of responsibilities and impediments to the escalation of problems that portray a dismissive management style. Issues were ignored or deferred to another and, in doing so, management neglected their responsibility for rectifying the identified problems. Such leadership reduced the chance of detecting and dealing with the traders’ behaviour and may have inadvertently fed the traders9 delusion that they could conceal the losses just long enough for their trading fortunes to turn round. This false sense of hope eventually created an irrecoverable AUD$360 million loss. As it turned out, the Bank was fortunate that a colleague took it upon himself to blow the whistle. Even though the leaders never participated in any of these deceptive activities, they arguably fell short of their responsibility to prevent such incidents. In fact, the 44ethical climate”，for which they were responsible arguably encouraged, or at least did not have the effect of discouraging, the traders9 behaviour.
Changes at the Bank since the announcement of the losses include the resignations of various staff and board members. The more notable departures have been that of the CEO Frank Cicutto, the Chairman of the Board,Charles Allen, and the Chair of the Audit Committee, Catherine Walter, who, as mentioned earlier, left somewhat reluctantly.
Cultural change requires a deep and personal commitment. Stewart will need to consider himself more as a “Chief Ethics Officer” than anything else (Trevino et al” 2000). He will need to communicate a strong and strict ethics message that will genuinely and personally commit his co-leaders. The leaders will need to be quite knowledgeable and understanding of their powers and responsibilities. Only when the leaders at NAB have established these characteristics can they proceed and system-atically address the issues discussed in this paper in the context of Schein^ six
primary mechanisms. Only then can the NAB move forward.
Source： Steven Dellaportas, Barry J. Cooper, Peter Braica.Leadship, Culture and Employee Deceit： the case of the National Australia Bank[J]. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE，2007，(15)： 1442-1452.
二、翻译文章 译文：
澳洲国民银行的领导、文化和员工欺骗案件
澳洲国民银行（NAB)是澳洲最大的一家银行。在2004年，由于4名员工掩 饰了未经授权的外汇交易活动，使银行损失3. 6亿元澳币。澳洲国民银行用适当 的风险控制和监督机制来加强公开市场交易平台的内部控制建设，然而风险管理 政策和程序被证实是无效的。本文的研究目的是通过对官方调查报告和其他发表 的文献资料的研究，分析澳洲国民银行欺骗案。研究结果表明，澳洲国民银行的 文化和领导人的地位导致了商业银行产生了利益驱动的内部文化，这种文化最终 对商业银行的外汇经营活动产生了影响。
关键词：澳大利亚；银行；董事会；风险管理；商业道德 澳大
利亚国际商业银行的欺骗交易案例 欺骗交易商
卢克?杜菲领导了这四个交易者的货币期权交易造成损失。 表一 ：6个主要的机制 机制 1.领导人注意、权衡和控制 描述 注重员工互相交流的重要性，低水平员工将 不断地成为他们交流的焦点，领导人经常进 行自我批评和自我肯定 2.危机的反应 这方式反应的是领导和其他人对危机作出 重要潜在的假定，创造新的标准、价值观和 工作程序。Schein (2004)断言一个组织危机 测试了一个领导者的价值观，可以让每一个 人都可以透明的看到，领导者面对危机问题 的理解和看法。Schein (2004)进一步申明情 感卷入的提升将增强学问的强度，从而影响 情感状况的改变 3.资源分配 员工的行为，态度以及他们的个人目标会受
澳洲国民银行的领导、文化和员工欺骗案件【外文翻译】.doc
