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原文：
Leadership,Culture and Employee Deceit： the case of the National
Australia Bank
The National Australia Bank(NAB)，one of Australia’s largest bank,announced losses in 2004 of AUD$360 million due to unauthorized foreign currency trading activities by four employees who incurred and deceptively concealed the losses.The NAB had in place risk limits and supervision to prevent trading desks ever reaching positions of this magnitude.However,the risk management policies and procedures proved ineffective.The purpose of this paper is to analyse the deceit,via a content analysis of official investigative reports and other published documents,to determine the extent to which the Bank9s culture and leadership may have influenced the rogue trades9 behavior.The findings suggest that cultural and leadship may have influenced the rogue traders9 behavior.The findings suggest that cultural issues,and the role played by the Bank9s leaders,were influential in creating a profit-driven culture that ultimately impacted the Bank9s foreign exchange operating activities.
Keywords ： Australia,banks,board of directors,risk management,business ethics The case of the National Australia Bank
The rogue traders
The four traders involved in the currency options trading losses were Luke Duffy. Table 1: Schein’s six primary mechanisms Mechanism Description 1 .What leaders pay attention Attention is concerned with communicating signals to to,measure,and control employees on important values.Lower-level staff will continually align their focus with their leaders by being alert and interested in their leaders concerns,satisfactions and criticisms The manner in which leaders and others react to a crisis reveals important underlying assumptions and creates new 2.Reaction to crises norms,values and working procedure.Even though a crisis is a matter of perception,Schein(2004) asserts that an organizational crisis tests a leader^ values and makes them visible for everyone to see.Schein(2004)further states that heightened emotional involvement increases the intensity of learning such emotionally-charged situations 3.Resource allocation Employees9 behaviour and attitudes and their personal goals are influenced by the leaders9 decisions on where and how they allocate the resources and how the resources are expected to be utilised 4.Role modelling Role modeling is concerned with how leaders behave and the example they set for others to follow.Leaders, visible behaviour and look to their leaders for cues on appropriate behaviour(Sim and Brinkmann,2003).Colloquial phrases such as “actions speak louder than words’’and “work the talk9,is the premise that underlies this mechanism. 5.Allocation of rewards An organization’s leader can quickly communicate priorities,values and assumptions,by consistently linking rewards and punishments to particular behaviours(Schein,2004,p.259).Members of an organization learn from their experience with promotions,performance appraisals and discussions with superiors.The similarities between rewards and status and attention are evident,yet they are not the same.The allocation of rewards and punishments crystallizes employees’ impression of important values communicated by leaders. 6.Criteria for selection and dismissal Selection of employees who resemble present members in style,assumptions,values and beliefs reinforces the leaders9 preferred values.Selection and dismissal is described by Schein(2004)as a subtle but potent method,in which culture is embedded and perpetuated by the organisation^ leaders. How the losses occurred The official investigations traced small losses from 2001-the starting point of the period of official investigations.The losses occurred principally because of increasing risk-taking trading
activities,combined with unexpected adverse currency
movements.In general,the currency options desk failed to anticipate and protect its positions against a sustained and significant rally in the Australia currency (AUD).In an effort to recoup the losses,and contrary to the Bank9s policy,the traders gambled heavily by taking out massive unhedged positions anticipating an increasing US dollar(USD).However,in September 2003,the USD declined and with a weakening USD,the traders maintained their strategy in anticipation of the USD reversing its position.Eventually,44with significant declines in the value of the USD against the AUD,the desk incurred major losses that were never recovered^XAPRA, 2004, pp.14-15). Extent of the losses
The investigations revealed that the majority of the losses occurred in the final quarter of 2003,escalating rapidly in December.In December 2003,the USD once again went into rapid decline as it had done in September 2003.By this time,the desk increased its exposure and was counting on the USD rallying back after its September decline.Once again,the traders miscalculated the direction of the change and in this short period the desk’s unhedged position incurred losses of AUD$49 million.In 2004,the situation did not improve as the USD fell further against the AUD and by 9 January 2004 the portfolio^ net USA position incurred further losses of AUD$85 million.The deceit was finaly revealed on 13 January,when the NAB announced it had experienced a loss of AUD$180 million from unauthorized dealing within its currency
options business.Subsequent announcements on 19 January and 27 January increased
the amount of the losses to AUD$360 million(APRA,2004;PwC,2004,p.l2) How the losses were concealed
The traders were able to conceal their activities primarily due to a weakness,accidentally discovered by one of the traders,in the end-of-day procedures carried out in the back-office.This weakness was referred to as the “one-hour window,,(PwC,2004,p.l3).The weakness centred on the end-of-day processing of transactions,which occurred in the morning following the day9s trading activities.The traders entered false transactions before the end-of-day close.This information was then used to prepare management reports and ultimately the Bank9s financial statements.The traders then had a “one-hour-window” of opportunity between 8.00am and 9.00am to reverse the false data entered into the system and avoid the system^ internal checks(APRA,2004,p.l6).The traders regularly used this practice to process false trades or deal rates and rollover losses.The “one-hour window” eventually became routine morning behaviour.The fictitious transaction produced profits for the trading desk,resulting in the traders receiving bonuses for 2003 totalling AUD$790,000 and ranging from AUD$120,000 to AUD$265,000 to individual traders(PwC,2004,p.l7). How were the losses uncovered?
Around 7.00am on 9 January 2004,a member of the currency options team 46blew the whistle^ to another member of the team,by expressing his concerns about the true position of the desk.This information was then relayed to the traders’ supervisor,around 11.00 am the same morning.Investigations proceeded over the weekend of 10/11 January, including various conversations between the traders, the analyst and their supervisor.Late on 12 January Ron Erdos (Head of Global Markets) was informed of the events.On Tuesday 13 January, the Bank publicly announced the losses and suspended the traders (PwC, 2004, p. 20). The aftermath
In June 2005, the former head of the FX trading desk, Luke Duffy, pleaded guilty to three charges of dishonestly using his position to gain advantage for himself and others and was sentenced in June 2005 to 29 months jail with a minimum period of 16
months. Gianni Gray also pleaded guilty to similar charges and was sentenced in April 2006 to 16 months jail, with a non-parole period of eight months. David Bullen and Vince Ficarra pleaded not guilty and were ordered to stand trial on a number of deception charges. In 2006, Bullen was found guilty of 17 of 19 charges for gaining financial advantages for himself and others, along with one count of gaining financial advantage by deception. Vince Ficarra was found guilty of all 12 charges against him -gaining financial advantage for himself and others, and one charge of gaining a bonus dishonestly. Bullen was sentenced to jail for a term of 44 months with a minimum of 30 months and Ficarra was sentenced to 28 months in jail with a minimum of 15 months.
The NAB suffered greatly from the scandal.In addition to the known losses of AUD$360 million, the desk was shut down for 15 months; a new chief executive, John Stewart,was appointed; 30 senior personnel were removed or reassigned; and the Bank was faced with 81 special APRA remedial requirements, which were expected to be dealt with by the Bank well into 2006 (Myer, 2005). With its reputation in decline and a shrinking market share, the Bank embarked on a process of rebuilding its culture which, according to the Bank9s executives, may take as long as five years to restore (Moncrief, 2005). The next section examines the Bank9s culture at the time of the deception and the extent to which its culture influenced the actions of the rogue traders. Analysis and discussion
This paper relies on Schein^ theoretical mechanisms to analyse the effect that leaders had on one of Australia^ largest financial deceptions. The data contained in the various reports and print media are analysed using the six primary mechanisms that leaders employ to embed and reinforce organisational culture(Schein, 2004). Attention
This facet of the Bank9s culture was commented upon most frequently by the investigation reports and later through the media^eaders9 attitudes appeared to be profit focused and sacrifices in ethical behaviour were acceptable in the name of profits. APRA’s(2004, p.6) concerns on leadership values are captured in the following statement： \some worrying signals of irregular practices on the currency options desk, these were ignored. ‘Profit is king’ was an expression frequently heard in
澳洲国民银行的领导、文化和员工欺骗案件【外文翻译】.doc
