世界半导体生产机台安全设计验收标准

- The equipment manufacturer should consider the type MEETS [ ] and quantity of hazardous process materials that may be used in the operation and maintenance of its equipment. The manufacturer should strive to avoid or minimize the use of hazardous process materials. If the end user's specific process chemistry is not defined, the equipment manufacturer's baseline process may be used for evaluation purposes. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] ADDRESSED Minimization of hazardous process materials is addressed in the Environmental Section of this S2 Engineering Report. Refer to Section for details. - Equipment manufacturers who do not have an MEETS [ ] established and active product safety program and a comprehensive understanding of safety standards should obtain the services of a product safety professional during the development of the equipment. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] ADDRESSED As noted in Section Applied Materials has an established safety program which utilizes both internal and external expertise.

SAFETY-RELATED SAFETY-RELATED SAFETY-RELATED INTERLOCKS

- All equipment should use fail-safe hardware MEETS [X] interlocks to protect against hazards inherent in the operation of the equipment. Hardware interlocks, when activated, should automatically bring the equipment to a safe standby condition and alert the operator immediately. The operator notification should provide an explanation of the cause. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] No additional safety related interlocks are provided on the Mirra Trak system as a result of the integration of the various component assemblies. At each point where there may be a hazard as a result of the integration, tool secured, and properly labeled guards are provided.

MEETS (FORMERLY ISSUE CATEGORY 4 - MINOR) 5A

During the evaluation, there was no consistent operator notification for the various interlocks on the system components. Applied Materials should ensure that operator notification is provided on the system following the activation of any of the safety related interlocks on the FABS, Mirra or OnTrak Synergy Integra assemblies. This operator notification should provide an explanation of the cause. One way to address this would be to provide interlock notification for any interlock activation on the main computer control screen.

This issue has a severity level of 4 (Minor) due to the fact that the interlocks on the system are present and will operate as intended but there will simply be no notification.

Applied Materials has provided a test data sheet which details the operator notification for the interlocks for the system. For Mirra interlocks, an explanation is provided on the main screen. For OnTrak interlocks, an error signal appears on the main screen and then more detailed information is available at the OnTrak touchscreen. For the FABS, there is an error on the main screen and the interlocks on the FABS cause the entire FABS unit to shut down so that no further indication is possible or required. This was verified during the re-inspection and this item has been reclassified as Meets. ADDRESSED

Each of the individual components oh the Mirra Trak system (FABS, Mirra and OnTrak Synergy Integra) are provided with hardware-based, safety-related interlocks. Reference the individual reports for each of these units for further information. - The interlock scheme should be designed to minimize MEETS [ ] the need to override automatic fail-safe interlock systems during maintenance activities. Safety interlocks in conjunction with physical barriers that operate at the point of the hazard are preferred (for example, a safety interlocked cover over a laser beam). When access to hazards that cannot be eliminated is required during maintenance, defeatable safety interlocks should be provided. Upon exiting the maintenance mode, all interlocks should be automatically restored. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[X] ADD[ ] REF[ ] NON-APPLICABLE The Integration of the various assemblies into the Mirra Trak system does not introduce any additional requirements to override system interlocks. See the individual reports for the FABS, Mirra, and OnTrak Synergy Integra for further information regarding the need to override interlocks on these units. - Each type of safety interlock and its operation should MEETS [X] be fully explained in the operations and maintenance manuals. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[ ] REF[ ] MEETS (FORMERLY ISSUE CATEGORY 4 - MINOR ) 5B The interlocks for the individual assemblies (FABS, Mirra, and OnTrak Synergy Integra) are described in their system manuals. Additionally, the manual for the Mirra Trak system describes the interlocks on the Mirra and FABS briefly and references the individual manuals for further information. However, there is no mention of the OnTrak Synergy Integra interlocks reference to the OnTrak manual for a discussion of these interlocks. Applied Materials should revise the Mirra Trak documentation to include a reference to the OnTrak Synergy Integra manual for a description of the interlocks used. It is also suggested that Applied Materials also provide a brief summary of the OnTrak Synergy Integra interlocks in the Mirra Trak system documentation. This issue has a severity level of 4 (Minor) based upon the fact that the interlocks on the system are present and are called out in the manuals for the individual units, but simply not called out in the integrated manual.

Applied Materials has provided updates to the system manual which includes a discussion of the hazards related to the integrated system. The manual for the OnTrak unit is referenced in the Mirra Trak Manuals and the reader is referenced to the specific manuals for the Mirra, FABS, and OnTrak unit for more detailed information regarding the operation of the safety related interlocks on each of the individual assemblies. Therefore, this item has been reclassified as Meets. - Equipment using greater than 30 VRMS, RF power, MEETS [ ] hazardous chemicals, lasers, UV light, and radiation generating sources should be provided with physical barriers (labeled as to the hazards they protect) or safety interlocks at the point of hazard. If the physical barrier does not require a tool to obtain access, the interlock is mandatory. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] ADDRESSED Reference Section for a discussion of the interlocks and guards used on the Mirra Trak system.

- All equipment using hazardous gas requiring detection MEETS [ ] should be able to interface with gas monitoring equipment. The output from gas monitoring equipment should initiate automatic shutdown of gas flows and place the equipment in a safe state. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[X] ADD[ ] REF[ ] NON-APPLICABLE There are no hazardous gases used on the system, therefore this section is not applicable. - When triggered, safety interlocks should place the MEETS [ ] point of hazard area in a safe state. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] ADDRESSED Reference Section for a discussion of the integration system interlocks. - When triggered, each affected safety interlock should MEETS [ ] require individual manual reset or restart before the equipment function can be restored. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ] N/A[ ] ADD[X] REF[ ] ADDRESSED Reference Section for a discussion of the integration system interlocks. - Computer hardware failure should automatically place MEETS [X] the equipment in a safe standby mode. Software safety interlocks should be backed up by hardware safety interlocks in all cases. ISSUE [ ] INFO REQUIRED [ ] RESPONDED [ ]