Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis
b. Social indifference curves are straight lines with slope of-2. This reflects the fact
that society values a \
c.
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7. Musgrave (1959) developed the concept of merit goods to describe commodities that ought to be provided even if the members of society do not demand them. \opposite way and apply to commodities that members of society might demand, but ought not to have? 8.
a. There is no obvious reason why there is a market failure with burglar alarm calls; the
Los Angeles police could set a response fee equal to the marginal cost. b. There is no obvious reason that the production of a documentary film about rock
music and the fall of the Soviet Union would improve welfare in the United States. c. There is no economic reason why cherry pies should be regulated, especially since
there are no such regulations for apple, blueberry, or peach frozen pies. d. It is hard to imagine a basis in welfare economics for this guarantee to the domestic
sugar producers, unless the utilities of sugar producers are given great weight in the social welfare function. e. This is not an efficient policy. If the problem is that too much water is being consumed,
then the answer is to increase the price of water. On that basis, people can decide whether or not they want to buy toilets that require less water. Water, like most other resources, is a private good. f. There is no obvious reason that the preservation of video game history would improve
welfare? 8. In this case, the \island. The set of possible allocations is a straight line, 100 units long. Every allocation is Pareto efficient, because the only way to make one person better off is to make another person worse off. There is no theory in the text to help us decide whether an allocation is fbir. Although splitting the peanuts even between the people may be fair, it may not be fair if the calorie “needs\of the people are different. With a social welfare function, we can make assessments on whether redistribution for society as a whole is a good thing.
9. Social welfare is maximized when Markos marginal utility of income is equal to Judy9s
marginal utility of income. Taking the derivative of Markos utility function to find his
1/2
marginal utility ftinction yields MUM = 50/(IM ) and taking the derivative of Judy's utility function yields MUJ = 100/(IJI/2). If we set MUM equal to MUJ, the condition for
maximization becomes IJ = 41M and, since the fixed amount of income is $300, this means that Mark should have $60 and Judy should have $240 if the goal is to maximize social welfare = UM + UJ.
11.
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Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis
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a. If the food is evenly distributed between Tang and Wilson, Tang will have 14」4 units of utility and Wilson will have 7.07 units of utility. b. If the social welfare function is UT+UW, then the marginal utilities of both should be equal to maximize social welfare. Equate MUT=1/(2FTI/2)to MUW=1/(4FWI/2
)
c. 皑於讪■电ngT&fiF塡用窪!翟輛驭?theii set UT=UW and substitute Fi=400?Fw and solve. Therefore, FT=80 and Fw=320. 12. Although Victoria's marginal rate of substitution is equal to Alberti, these are not equal to the marginal rate of transformation and the allocation is, therefore, Pareto inefficient. Both people would give up 2 cups of tea for 1 crumpet but, according to the production function, could actually get 6 crumpets by giving up 2 cups of tea. By giving up tea and getting crumpets through the production function, both utilities are raised. 13.
a. The marginal rates of substitution for coffee and for tea are constant for both Hannah and Jose. Hannah would trade % pound of coffee for 1/3 pound of tea to remain equally satisfied. Similarly, Jose would trade % pound of tea for 1/3 pound of coffee to remain equally satisfied. The constant MRS means linear indifference curves b. Green indifference curves are Josefs and red indifference curves are Hannah's.
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Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis
c. The contract curve follows the bottom and right borders of the Edgeworth Box. At any interior point in the box, the parties will find it in their interest to trade until they reach these borders. This is because Hannah would only choose to consume tea once she has consumed all the coffee in the economy. Likewise, Jose would only choose to consume coffee once he has consumed all the tea in the economy. d. The initial allocation is not Pareto efficient. It is possible to make one better off without making the other worse off. 14.
a. False. As shown in the text, equality of the marginal rates of substitution is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. The MRS for each individual must also equal the MRT. b. Uncertain. As long as the allocation is an interior solution in the Edgeworth box, the marginal rates of substitution must be equal across individuals. This need not be true, however, at the comers where one consumer has all the goods in the economy. c. False. A policy that leads to a Pareto improvement results in greater efficiency, but social
welfare depends on equity as well as efficiency. A policy that improves efficiency but creates a loss in equity might reduce social welfare. d? False. Moving to a point on the utility possibilities curve may not result in a Pareto
improvement because one party may receive less utility on the curve than they received at the interior point.
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