Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Auction Mechanisms for Resource Allocation

Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Auction Mechanisms for Resource Allocation

Yu-E Sun;He Huang;Xiang-Yang Li;Yang Du;Miaomiao Tian;Hongli Xu;Mingjun Xiao

【期刊名称】《清华大学学报（英文版）》 【年(卷),期】2017(022)002

【摘要】In recent years,auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources.However,most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions,which is not always true in a more realistic scenario.Besides the privacy-preserving issue,the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction mechanism design.In this paper,we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects.We discuss two multi-unit auction models:the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NP-hard,we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models.We prove

that

the

proposed

auction

mechanisms

are

strategyproof.Moreover,we also prove that the privacy of bid value from each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms.To the best of our knowledge,this is the first work on the strategyproof multi-unit

auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social efficiency maximization.The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and communication overheads.

【总页数】16页(119-134) 【关键词】

【作者】Yu-E Sun;He Huang;Xiang-Yang Li;Yang Du;Miaomiao Tian;Hongli Xu;Mingjun Xiao

【作者单位】School of Urban Rail Transportation,Soochow University,Suzhou

215006,China;Suzhou

Institute

for

Advanced

Study,University of Science and Technology of China,Suzhou 215123,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,Soochow University,Suzhou

215006,China;Suzhou

Institute

for

Advanced

Study,University of Science and Technology of China,Suzhou 215123,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,University of Science and Technology of

China,Hefei

230026,China;Suzhou

Institute

for

Advanced

Study,University of Science and Technology of China,Suzhou 215123,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,Anhui University,Hefei 230031,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei

230026,China;Suzhou Institute for Advanced Study,University of Science and Technology of China,Suzhou 215123,China;School of Computer Science and Technology,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei

230026,China;Suzhou

Institute

for

Advanced

Study,University of Science and Technology of China,Suzhou 215123,China 【正文语种】英文 【中图分类】 【文献来源】

https://www.zhangqiaokeyan.com/academic-journal-cn_tsinghua-science-technology_thesis/0201250458610.html 【相关文献】

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