聂辉华_契约理论
《契约理论》第一次习题
1、假设委托人是风险中性的，代理人的效用函数为u(w,e)?21。努力的产出如下图分布。
努力
问：
（1）在对称信息情况下，委托人会要求代理人提供何种努力水平？ （2）在不对称信息情况下，委托人给予代理人的最佳契约是什么？
2、Consider the modified linear managerial-incentive-scheme problem, where the manager’s effort, a affects current profits, q1?a??q1, and future profits, q2?a??q2, where ?qt are
2i.i.d. with normal distribution N(0,?q). The manager has utility function?exp(??t?) and
w?e2，其保留效用为
产出分布 e=0 e=3 x=0 0.4 0.2 x=1000 0.4 0.4 x=2500 0.2 0.4 retires at the end of first period, and the manager’s compensation cannot be based on q2. However, her compensation can depend on the stock price P?2a??P, where ?P2(0,?P).
2Derive the optimal compensation contract t?w?fq1?sP. Discuss how it depends on ?P
and on its relation with
2. ?q
《契约理论》第一次习题.doc
