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外文翻译
题 目 民营企业人才储备计划的问题分析及对策研究 学 院 商学院 专 业 人力资源管理 班 级 学 号 学生姓名 指导教师 外文题目 Differentiation Of Skills, Firms’ Recruitment Strategy And Unemployment Benefits In An Efficiency Wage Model 外文出处 De Economist 外文作者 Frédéric Gavrel
原文：
Differentiation of Skills, Firms’ Recruitment Strategy and Unemployment Benefits in an Efficiency Wage Model
Frédéric Gavrel Summary:
It is well known that the recruitment strategy of firms depends on the state of the labour market. In order to account for this fact, we build a matching model where the differentiation of skills is explicit. Along the line of Salop 1979b workers and firms are distributed on the same circle and the distance between two points on this circle measures the mismatch between a firm and a worker. Another feature of this model concerns wage setting. In a natural way, wages are subject to the constraint that ‘good’ workers (i.e. workers who are not ‘too’ far on the circle prefer to keep their job. In addition, on a suggestion by Phelps 1992, we assume that workers who quit their job are not eligible to unemployment insurance. Two main results are established. First, the lower the tightness of the labour market the more stringent the requirements of firms are. Second, as a consequence of the incentive constraint, unemployment benefits appear to raise employment.
Key words: differentiation of skills, matching, recruitment strategy, efficiency wage, unemployment benefits
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, many analyses of the labour market rest on a matching model. According to this approach, the heterogeneity of the workforce and the jobs and the imperfect information of agents explain why unemployment and vacancies can permanently coexist and why the so-called Beveridge curve does not coincide with one of the axes of the diagram.
For the sake of simplicity, standard matching models Pissarides 1990 formalize the frictions of the labour market by assuming that the hiring flow per period rises continuously with the stock of unemployed people and vacancies. However, though a simple and useful tool, this hiring function is subject to serious limits.
First, it is a shortcut and, from a theoretical point of view, such an ‘adhocery’ is quite unsatisfactory. Overall, this tool of analysis occults some important aspects of the hiring process.
In particular, the hiring flow depends on the behavior of firms whose recruitment strategy reflects the tightness of the labour market.
One aim of this article is to account for this fact. To that purpose, we build a matching model where the differentiation of workers and jobs as well as the searching behaviour of the unemployed are explicit. The hiring process is then based on microeconomic grounds. Considering the differentiation of agents, we adopt the approach of Salop( 1979b).Workers and firms are distributed on the same circle and the distance between two points on this circle measures the mismatch between the requirements of a firm and the skill of a worker. Regarding job search, we assume that workers issue one application in each period until they find an acceptable job. Another feature of this model concerns wage setting. Usually, in matching models, wages are negotiated :the surplus created by the formation of an employer-employee pair is divided between both parties according to their bargaining power. Here,in a natural way, we assume that firms decide on wages so that ‘good’ workers( i.e. workers who are not ‘too’ far on the circle )prefer to keep their job. In other terms, as in Phelps (1970) and Salop (1979a), wages are subject to an incentive constraint, the ‘no quitting’ constraint. Taking their wage decision, firms then face a trade-off between their labour costs and the probability of filling their vacancies which rises with the number of workers who are ready to accept their wage offer.
In addition, on a suggestion by Phelps (1992), we assume that workers who quit their job are not eligible to unemployment insurance. In other terms, only workers whose jobs are destroyed can receive unemployment benefits.
Two main results are established. First, the lower the tightness of the labour market the stronger the requirements of firms are. Second, as a consequence of the incentive constraint, unemployment benefits appear to raise employment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we study the behaviour of firms and their recruitment strategy. In section 4, we study the equilibrium and the comparative statics of the model. The last section collects some final comments.
2 THE MODEL
The economy includes two sets of numerous risk-nautral agents: the workers and the firms. The workers, in number N, are heterogenous. The jobs which the firms offer them are
heterogenous too.
All the workers are infinitely lived. On the contrary ,the firms, which produce the same good, can die. We assume that, at each period, the firms face a constant risk of destruction; its probability is denoted by s. The firms are then eternally young like the households in Blanchard and Fisher(1989).By the law of large numbers, a share, s, of the firms disappears at each period. However, the free entry of new firms on the market stabilizes their number. All the agents have the same discount rate, r. Let R denote the sum (1+r).
In order to describe the differentiation of workers and jobs, we use the tool of analysis of Salop (1979b).
2.1 The cirle of skills
We assume that the set of the workers is uniformly distributed on a circle which circumference is equal to two(see Figure 1).This distribution is exogenous. The position of a worker on this circle does not represent his spatial localization or the level of his ability but the ‘type’ of his skill. The distribution of the firms on the circle, which is endogenous, is uniform too.1 Likewise, the position of a firm on the circle represents its ‘type,’ that is the skill which perfectly suits its needs. When differentiation is modelled with a circle, each job and each worker face the same situation. Indeed, each job, whatever its requirements, faces the same distribution of more or less suitable workers. The model makes the heterogeneity of jobs and workers compatible with the symmetry of their situation. So, workers have the same hiring opportunities and employers adopt the same recruitment strategy. In short, the circle symmetry allows me to base the usual matching model (Pissarides( 1990)) on microeconomic grounds.
Let’s consider two points A and B on the circle of skills. Let l be the distance between A and B ( 0≤l≤1). This distance measures the match between the type of a worker located in A or a firm, respectively and the type of a firm located in B or a worker, respectively. Thus, the match is perfect when the distance l equals zero. On the opposite, the mismatch is maximum when l reaches unity.
Each active firm employs only one worker. The production of an active firm is a constant denoted by y. In other words, we assume that production y does not depend on mismatch l. Conversely, the mismatch affects the effort which workers have to perform in order to reach production y. Consequently, the disutility of a worker is an increasing function in distance l between his skill and the needs of the firm which employs him.
2.2 Hiring process and flow equilibrium
Following the job search theory of Mc Kenna (1985), we assume for simplicity that each unemployed issues just one application per period. Because they have no priori information about job offers, the hiring firm they meet is drawn at random. One important assumption is that when a meeting occurs, information is asymmetric. Only firms know the type of their applicants. But, this asymmetry lasts for just one period the hiring period and the new employees learn the type of their job when they start working. Although unusual, this assumption about
the information available to both parties is quite natural in this context. Specifically, we assume that the examination of applicants is accurate enough to predict the firms with the perfect knowledge of their characteristics. They can then measure the extent of the mismatch. Conversely, workers do not learn about jobs before work begins. Indeed, for wage setting to be derived from the no quitting condition, the information of workers must be postponed until the beginning of the production process. Then, jobs’ attributes can be experienced. As a consequence, firms decide on the mismatch limit, that is, the distance to their own type, denoted by, above which an applicant will be rejected. At this stage of the analysis, the limit is exogenous.
在一个高效工资模式中,企业在人才招聘策略和失业救济金之间的技术区别[文献翻译]
